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Which products and at which prices will be provided by markets where heterogeneous …rms sell di¤erentiated goods? This basic question should be at the core of modern economic theories that depart from the perfectly competitive paradigm by adopting the monopolistic competition set up pioneered by Chamberlin (1933) . Most of these theories rely on a simpli…ed model with symmetric and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, Section I) , which delivers constant markups, either across countries and among …rms in trade models (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003) or over time in macroeconomic models with ‡exible prices (Romer, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) . Few applications use more general but still symmetric preferences (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, Section II; Bertoletti and Etro, 2016) , even when considering variable productivity across …rms (as in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008 , Arkolakis et al., 2019 , Dhingra and Morrow, 2019 and over time (as in Kimball, 1995 , or Bilbiie et al., 2012 . In an attempt to capture the features of monopolistic competition in the spirit of Chamberlin, 2 we study a large industry with heterogeneous …rms supplying genuinely di¤erentiated commodities, and develop a methodology to characterize monopolistic competition in such a setting. 3 This suggests a richer approach to the di¤erences between goods, …rms and markets as well as over time, where such a variability matters also because it introduces new sources of ine¢ ciency, both in the choice of the production mix and in the selection of …rms, which are absent in the case of symmetric preferences and thus tend to be overlooked. We propose applications to trade, with markups variable across goods of di¤erent and endogenous quality, and to macroeconomics, with markups depending on aggregate variables that can magnify business cycle propagation.
Consider demand systems derived from preferences over a variety of di¤erent commodities that can be represented by well-behaved utility functions. Each commodity is produced with idiosyncratic marginal and …xed costs. Our basic question is simply which strategies are adopted by …rms in such a market. The starting point is the analysis of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in which …rms choose either their quantities or their prices taking as given the strategies of the competitors and the demand systems. We generalize the familiar pricing conditions by expressing the equilibrium markup of …rms in terms of their market shares and of the substitutability of their own products with those sold by competitors. Substitutability is measured by (the average of) the Morishima Elasticities of Substitution, as rediscovered and formalized by Blackorby and Russell (1981) . 4 On this basis, we discuss how to solve for Cournot and 2 Chamberlin (1933) de…ned monopolistic competition with reference to factors a¤ecting the shape of the demand curve, and certainly did not intend to limit his analysis to the case of symmetric goods. He saw no discontinuity between its own market theory and the theory of monopoly as familiarly conceived, claiming inter alia that "monopolistic competition embraces the whole theory of monopoly. But it also looks beyond, and considers the interrelations, wherever they exist, between monopolists who are in some appreciable degree of competition with each other." (Chamberlin, 1937, p. 571-2) .
3 See also the seminal work of Spence (1976) , who explicitly deals with the problem of product selection, focusing on quasi-linear preferences. 4 The Morishima Elasticity of Substitution was originally proposed by Morishima (1967) in Bertrand equilibria by computing the Morishima measures. We then move to competition among a large number of …rms where, in line with Spence (1976) and Stiglitz (1977, 1993) , market shares are negligible. In particular, we de…ne monopolistic competition as the case in which …rms "perceive" demand elasticity as given by the average Morishima elasticity (which approximately coincides with the actual one when market shares are indeed small enough). And we introduce free entry to ask a few fundamental questions, such as which products are provided by the market, what kind of selection is associated with changes in market size (i.e., opening up to free trade), expenditure (i.e., a demand shock) and aggregate productivity (i.e., technological growth) and what is the relation with an optimal provision of goods chosen by a social planner. The answers are simple under (asymmetric) CES preferences, because the set of goods provided by the market is not a¤ected by changes of aggregate productivity, an increase of expenditure or market size delivers new goods but without a¤ecting the entry sequence, and the latter corresponds to the optimal one. This is not the case in general, but we will show that the irrelevance of (common) productivity shocks is preserved under homothetic preferences, the neutrality of expenditure under directly additive preferences, the neutrality of the market size under indirectly additive preferences and the optimality of market entry under the unexplored class of implicit CES preferences.
Since typical demand systems depend on simple aggregators of …rm strategies, we study in further depth monopolistic competition for the Generalized Additively Separable (GAS) preferences introduced by Pollak (1972) and Gorman (1970a Gorman ( , 1987 , which deliver demand systems depending on one aggregator. Analyzing monopolistic competition with GAS preferences, intuition suggests that to take the common aggregator as given while computing the elasticity of demand should be approximately correct (i.e., pro…t maximizing) when market shares are negligible. We show that this is indeed the case, in the sense that these perceived demand elasticities are approximately equal to the average Morishima measures (which in turn are close to the actual ones) when shares are negligible. In addition, the equilibrium strategies do not depend on whether prices or quantities are chosen by the …rms, implying that imperfectly competitive choices do actually "converge" to those of monopolistic competition.
This approach provides a simple way to solve for asymmetric equilibria, and it allows the computation of prices in closed-form solution for a variety of examples. 5 Under additivity of preferences we can show uniqueness of the free entry equilibrium in spite of asymmetries between goods, and make some comparison among …rms that are active in equilibrium and in the social optimum. a book review written in Japanese. 5 We also extend the same approach to separable preferences that generate demand functions depending on multiple aggregators. In particular, we discuss preferences that feature separability of marginal utilities (including a generalization of the preferences employed by Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) , and the case of the so-called implicitly additive preferences (Hanoch, 1975) , as well as an example of restricted AIDS preferences (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) .
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In addition, for the class of directly additive preferences we show that an increase in the market size (i.e. opening up to costless trade) favors the entry of goods with a less elastic demand, while changes in expenditure are neutral on the entry sequence. For the class of indirectly additive preferences, equilibrium pricing is independent across …rms and the price of each …rm only depends on its marginal cost, product substitutability and consumers'expenditure. Moreover, an increase in the market size is always neutral on prices as well as on the entry sequence, while an increase of expenditure (i.e. a positive demand shock) favors the entry of …rms facing demands perceived as most elastic.
We then introduce the more general Gorman-Pollak preferences to the analysis of monopolistic competition, which deliver a markup depending both on the quantity or price of the …rm and on the common aggregator, and can be exploited in trade applications where markups change between goods and across destinations (nesting results in Bertoletti et al., 2018, and Arkolakis et al., 2019) . The special case of constant markups that di¤er across goods emerges in case of "power" additive subutilities and with the unexplored "self-dual addilog" preferences (see Houthakker, 1965) . Such examples can be exploited in trade applications where …rms sell goods of di¤erent qualities at di¤erent markups in di¤erent markets, whose empirical relevance has been pointed out in Manova and Zhang (2012) and others.
We …nally discuss the class of "implicit CES"preferences (Gorman, 1970a,b, and Russell, 1981) , which also belong to the GAS type and are suitable for trade and macroeconomic applications. These preferences deliver markups common across goods that vary directly with the utility level (which is the relevant aggregator). We employ them to present two general equilibrium applications. In a trade model à la Melitz with free entry of heterogeneous …rms producing goods of di¤erent qualities these preferences generate novel selection e¤ects: in particular, we show that opening up to costless trade can reduce markups, change the endogenous distribution of qualities across active …rms and select more e¢ cient …rms. While none of these e¤ects of "globalization" is produced under symmetric CES preferences, they emerge naturally in a setting with these and other asymmetric preferences. In a dynamic macroeconomic model, we show that these preferences provide a channel of propagation of aggregate shocks through endogenous markup variability: in particular, countercyclical markups can magnify positive temporary shocks by reducing the relative price of the …nal goods and promoting aggregate consumption. These insights extend to other non-homothetic preferences and deliver a new role for demand in business cycle models with ‡exible prices.
Our work is related to di¤erent literatures. We generalize the analysis of imperfect competition with di¤erentiated products (usually studied under quasilinear preferences: see Vives, 1999) by reframing it in terms of the Morishima elasticities. After the seminal contribution of Spence (1976) , only few papers have analyzed monopolistic competition with asymmetric preferences. The work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977: Section III) only dealt with a speci…c example with intersectoral perfect substitutability. The earliest treatement we are aware of is in a work of Pascoa (1997) , mainly focused on an example with Stone-Geary preferences and a continuum of goods. More recently, D 'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2016, 2017) have provided a related analysis of asymmetric preferences with an outside good adopting an alternative equilibrium concept, but their monopolistic competition limit is consistent with ours when market shares are negligible. We are not aware of other studies on equilibrium and optimal entry under asymmetric preferences. The trade literature with heterogeneous …rms, started by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , has usually considered monopolistic competition with symmetric preferences; only a few works have added asymmetries to model quality di¤erentials among goods (for instance Baldwin and Harrigan, 2012 , Crozet et al., 2012 , and Feenstra and Romalis, 2014 , but retaining a CES structure. We follow the spirit of this literature generalizing it to genuinely asymmetric preferences that deliver possibly di¤erent and variable markups.
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The work is organized as follows. Section 1 presents alternative equilibria of imperfect competition for the same demand microfoundation. Section 2 and 3 study monopolistic competition under homothetic and GAS preferences. Section 4 extends our approach to the case of other separable preferences. Section 5 sketches applications to trade and macroeconomics. Section 6 concludes. Propositions concerning particular classes of preferences are proved in the Appendix.
The Model
We consider L identical consumers with preferences over a …nite number n of commodities represented by well-behaved direct and indirect utility functions:
where x is the n-dimensional vector of quantities and s = p=E is the corresponding vector of prices normalized by expenditure E. We assume that the utility maximizing choices are unique, interior (x; p > 0) and characterized by the …rst-order conditions for utility maximization. Therefore, the inverse and direct (Marshallian) demand systems are delivered by Hotelling-Wold's and Roy's identities:
where
and U i and V i denote marginal utilities, i = 1; ::; n. Here e is the marginal utility of income times the expenditure level, and it holds that j (s)j = e (x(s)), as can be veri…ed by adding up the market shares b j = s j x j . As a simple example we will occasionally refer to the asymmetric CES preferences, that can be represented by
where q j = e q j > 0 can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic quality index for good j, and = 1=" 2 [0; 1) governs substitutability between goods.
Firm i produces good i at the marginal cost c i = e c i =A > 0, where the common parameter A > 0 represents aggregate productivity: the variable pro…ts of …rm i are then given by:
We begin by studying market equilibria in which …rms correctly perceive the demand system and choose their pro…t-maximizing strategies. In the tradition of industrial organization we have to consider two cases, with each …rm choosing either its production level (Cournot competition) or its price (Bertrand competition). We then use these equilibria to de…ne a generalized form of monopolistic competition, and to discuss entry.
Competition in quantities
Let us consider …rms that choose their quantities on the basis of the inverse demand functions s i (x) in (2). Correctly anticipating the quantities produced by the competitors, each …rm i chooses x i to equate its marginal revenue to its marginal cost c i . The relevant (per-consumer) marginal revenue of …rm i is
It can be written as:
where the (gross) Morishima Elasticity of Complementarity, henceforth MEC, between varieties i and j is de…ned as:
This inverse measure of substitutability depends on preferences and not on the speci…c utility function which is chosen to represent them. Since substitutability can di¤er among goods, let us compute the weighted average of the MECs for good i with respect to all the other goods j, with weights based on the expenditure shares b j (x) = s j (x)x j , namely:
It is immediate to verify that the marginal revenue can be rewritten as
, and that the Cournot equilibrium quantities satisfy the system:
for i = 1; 2; :::; n,
where the left hand side comes from the inverse demand given in (2) and the right hand side depends on:
Here C i is an increasing function of the market share of …rm i and of its average Morishima elasticity i (which we assume to be smaller than unity). 9 Intuitively, a …rm's markup is higher when it supplies a good that is on average less substitutable with the other goods (high i ), and its market share is larger (high b i ). In the CES example (4) corresponds to the common and constant MEC, and one can obtain closed form solutions in simple cases.
Competition in prices
Consider now …rms that choose their prices on the basis of the direct demand x i (s) in (2), while correctly anticipating the prices of the competitors. The elasticity of the Marshallian direct demand of …rm i can be computed as:
Consider the (gross) Morishima Elasticity of Substitution, or MES, between goods i and j:
8 Throughout this work we assume that the …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization characterizes …rm behaviour. Of course, existence and unicity of market equilibrium also require that the demand system satis…es a number of regularity conditions (for a related discussion see Vives, 1999, Ch. 6) .
9 Note that ij < 1 is equivalent to the condition that the relative expenditure s i x i =s j x j is (locally) increasing with respect to x i , but it would be compatible with i and j being either q-substitutes (@ ln s j =@ ln x i < 0) or q-complements (@ ln s j =@ ln x i > 0). Of course, i (x) < 1 is a weaker condition.
1 0 See Blackorby and Russell (1981) and Blackorby et al. (2007) . The higher is " ij the greater is the possibility of good j to substitute for good i. Notice that " ii = 0 and that in general " ij 6 = " ji for i 6 = j. which again depends on preferences and not on their speci…c representations, and compute the weighted average:
(assumed larger than unity), 11 where, with a little abuse of notation, b j (s) = s j x j (s) is now the expenditure share of …rm i as a function of normalized prices.
We can now rewrite the demand elasticity j@ ln x i =@ ln p i j as:
to de…ne the Bertrand equilibrium through the following system:
for i = 1; 2; ::; n:
Firms set higher markups if their goods are on average less substitutable than those of competitors (low " i ) and their market shares larger (high b i ). In the CES example (4) the parameter " is the constant and symmetric MES and is the reciprocal of the common MEC.
Generalized monopolistic competition
The remainder of this work is dedicated to analyze monopolistic competition under asymmetric preferences. There are alternative ways to make sense of this concept but, in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz's (1993) reply to Yang and Heidra (1993) , we interpret monopolistic competition as the result of having …rms that correctly perceive market shares as negligible. In fact, what Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) did in their symmetric setting amounts to neglect any term of order 1=n in the demand elasticities, where n was a number of …rms assumed su¢ ciently large to make the omitted terms small. Similarly, in our setting, when there are many goods we expect consumers to spread their expenditure if preferences are well-behaved and not too asymmetric, so that the market shares should be small for all goods. 12 On this basis, our previous results suggest to approximate the relevant demand elasticities with the corresponding averages of the Morishima measures.
Accordingly, we de…ne as monopolistically competitive an environment where market shares are negligible, that is b i 0 for any i = 1; ::; n, and where …rms, correctly anticipating the value of actual demands, "perceive"the relevant elasticities as given by the average Morishima elasticities. This approach actually leads to two approximations according to whether we refer either to quantity 1 1 Here " ij > 1 is equivalent to the condition that the relative expenditure s i x i =s j x j is (locally) decreasing with respect to s i , and it would be compatible with i and j being either so-called p-substitutes (@ ln x j =@ ln s i > 0) or p-complements (@ ln x j =@ ln s i < 0).
1 2 Su¢ cient conditions on preferences to deliver this result are studied in Vives (1987) . 8 or to price competition. In the …rst case we approximate (8) by using the expression:
In the second case we approximate (13) by:
These simpli…ed systems need to be solved to derive the prices and quantities which arise in a monopolistic competition equilibrium (that ought to imply negligible market shares). Once we depart from symmetry this may still be a formidable task, but in next sections we will consider a methodology that allows one to obtain explicit solutions for several classes of asymmetric preferences. We can learn something more about this approach to monopolistic competition by considering the relevant cross demand elasticities. They can be computed as:
When shares are indeed negligible the cross e¤ects should be perceived as negligible too whenever the di¤erences ij i and " ij " i are small and the perceived own elasticities are not very large. Apparently, this is the case that Dixit and Stiglitz (1993) had in mind, and we expect it to apply to the typical monopolistic competition equilibrium with positive markups. Notice that the former condition is satis…ed in any equilibrium of a symmetric environment. However, both conditions might be violated in our asymmetric setting: in similar cases the perceived cross demand elasticities can be large, and associated to a large own demand elasticity and therefore to small equilibrium markups. In other words, it can happen that goods are perceived as highly substitutable and that monopolistic competition pricing approximates marginal cost pricing as in a perfectly competitive setting. 13 We will exemplify this possibility in Section 2.1, namely for the case of translog preferences, and in Appendix F in the case of restricted AIDS preferences (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) . Note that in the CES case (4) the conditions (14) and (15) do characterize the same monopolistic competition solution:
and that in such a case the cross e¤ects (16) and (17) actually vanish when market shares become negligible.
Entry
Which goods will be provided in a monopolistic competition equilibrium and which goods should be provided by a social planner? In this section we discuss these questions by considering free entry equilibria when the production of each good requires a positive …xed cost. 14 This analysis is of course important for general equilibrium applications of monopolistic competition. 15 Let us assume that preferences are de…ned over a large but …nite set of N di¤erent commodities, and that each good i 2 can be produced by a single …rm only after paying a …xed entry cost F i > 0. In the spirit of Chamberlin (1933) , one can think of …rms entering the market as long as they can price above the average cost. 16 Under monopolistic competition there are n N active …rms: the price of the other N n goods should be set above their choke levels, or equivalently at 1. The variable pro…ts of an active …rm i = 1; :::; n can be written as i = pi ci pi b i EL. By using equilibrium pricing condition (15) and de…ning i @ ln V =@ ln s i as the price elasticity of utility of commodity i, with average 1 n P n j=1 j , we can express equilibrium pro…ts as:
(a corresponding formula can be obtained from the dual representation of preferences through the average MEC). Since EL=n are common to all …rms, this implies that active …rms with a lower average MES and a higher ratio i = have higher variable pro…ts because they can set higher markups and conquer larger market shares (these elasticities determine the intensive and extensive pro…t margins). In a free entry equilibrium only …rms covering …xed costs with their variable pro…ts can be active. Let us brie ‡y consider also an optimal allocation of resources. A social planner maximizing utility under a resource constraint EL = P n j=1 (c j x j L + F j ) would set a common markup on all goods: this already implies that a market 1 4 It may be useful to remind the reader that without …xed costs a perfectly competitive market would optimally provide all the suitable goods by pricing them at marginal cost. The question of which goods are actually introduced becomes relevant under …xed costs and asymmetric preferences (since with symmetry it simpli…es to the question of which number of goods should be provided).
1 5 For these applications, one can also add to our basic setting a good representing the outside economy. This is particularly relevant for trade applications with a competitive sector and for macroeconomic applications with labor supply. Pricing within the monopolistically competitive sector carries on unchanged after imposing independent pricing for the outside good and taking this into account in the computation of the Morishima elasticities.
1 6 One can also consider an entry process à la Melitz (2003) that exhausts expected pro…ts: given an ex ante probability distribution over parameters indexing the goods to be produced, …rms would enter the market until they expect pro…ts to cover the entry cost. This would leave unchanged the competition stage whenever costs and market size attract a number of …rms large enough to justify the assumption of small market shares (see Section 5.1). equilibrium tends to provide too much of the goods with a low average MES. Without loss of generality, the optimal prices can be set at the marginal costs when the …xed costs are directly paid out of individual expenditure. Accordingly, the social planner chooses the set of goods to be provided to solve:
Of course, as long as unproduced goods become less costly, they can enter the set of optimally provided goods. At this level of generality, we can neither exclude a multiplicity of market equilibria, nor we can compare them to a social optimum: however, progress can be made under further assumptions on the preferences. As a benchmark, let us reconsider the CES example (4), and let b be a set of goods provided in equilibrium at prices (18) and an optimal commodity set. 17 We can directly compute pro…ts (19) for a given expenditure as:
which is independent from aggregate productivity A (an increase of productivity reduces prices while increasing proportionally demand so that pro…ts, and thus b , remain unchanged), and linear with respect to the total market size EL (for a given set of …rms). Thus, the condition of a non-negative pro…t for good i,
uniquely de…nes an order among …rms based on the value of the left-hand side of (22): it is natural to think of it as establishing the sequence of market introduction (see Section 3.1). Moreover, the equilibrium order is identical to the welfare order implicitly de…ned by (20), which now reads as:
Accordingly, a good i should be optimally provided only if:
where is the relevant resource opportunity cost. Thus, as we will prove formally in Section 3, the asymmetric CES preferences generate a free entry equilibrium and a social optimum such that the identity of the goods introduced is independent from aggregate productivity A and it is determined by the total market size EL, while the sequence of introduction is una¤ected from either expenditure E or market size L. In fact, one can also verify that the free entry equilibrium is optimal if industry pro…ts are redistributed as additional income to consumers.
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In this example, as in endogenous growth models based on CES speci…ca-tions à la Romer (1990) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) , the sequence of new goods introduced in the economy does not deviate from the sequence of varieties that would be introduced by a social planner, in spite of asymmetries or shocks to aggregate productivity, income and population. Under more general conditions there is no reason why the market should be expected to provide the optimal set of goods, or to introduce them in the optimal order independently from shocks, but we will see that some of the special properties of the CES example will extend to more general classes of preferences. In particular, the irrelevance of productivity shocks will be preserved under homothetic preferences, the neutrality of expenditure under directly additive preferences, the neutrality of the market size under indirectly additive preferences and the optimality of market entry under implicit CES preferences.
Homothetic preferences
Monopolistic competition with symmetric homothetic preferences has been studied by Benassy (1996) and others. 19 Here we are concerned with the more general case of asymmetric homothetic preferences, because they are crucial for representative agent models and provide an interesting application of our proposed equilibria. Let us normalize the indirect utility function to be:
where P is homogeneous of degree 1 and represents a fully- ‡edged price index.
, which are homogeneous respectively of degree 1 and 0. This allows us to compute 1 8 This can be con…rmed by using the marginal utility of income for , and computing:
whereÊ is the equilibrium expenditure level. 1 9 See Feenstra (2003) on translog preferences, and Feenstra (2018) for its generalization to the case of the so-called "quadratic mean of order r" (QMOR) preferences (with in addition heterogeneous …rms). 12 the MES as:
which is homogeneous of degree 0, being the di¤erence of two functions that are both homogeneous of that degree. Therefore also the average MES " i (s) are homogeneous of degree zero, which implies immediately that pricing is independent from the expenditure level (for a given set of …rms). 20 Similar results can be derived starting from the direct utility (which can be written as a consumption index) and using the inverse demand system and the average MEC to study quantity competition.
Examples
We now consider equilibrium pricing for two speci…cations of homothetic preferences.
Translog preferences As a …rst example, let us consider the homothetic translog preferences (Christensen et al., 1975) represented by the following price index:
where we assume without loss of generality ij = ji , and we need P i i = 1 and P j ij = 0 to satisfy the linear homogeneity of P (a symmetric version of these preferences is used by Feenstra, 2003) . The direct demand for good i is:
which delivers the market share b i = i + P j ij ln s j . Maximization of pro…ts provides the Bertrand equilibrium conditions:
where the positiveness of i ii is necessary to ensure "
We can obtain the same result, as well as the monopolistic competition equilibrium, by deriving the Morishima elasticity between goods i and j as:
so that the average MES is:
This allows one to get (26) from (13), and to obtain the monopolistic competition prices:
from (15). Notice that the prices of monopolistic competition are below the Bertrand prices (26) for given market shares, and that, when market shares are negligible (b i 0), the average MES is large, goods are highly substitutable and prices must be close to the marginal costs (i.e., b p i c i ), approaching the case of perfect competition.
Generalized linear preferences Let us now consider an example of homothetic preferences due to Diewert (1971) . Suppose that preferences can be represented by the following direct utility/consumption index:
where, without loss of generality, we can take the matrix A to be symmetric. To satisfy the standard regularity conditions we assume that a ij 0 for any i; j (notice that parameters a ii , i = 1; ::; n have no impact on the Hessian D 2 U ). Here we obtain U i = P j a ij p x j = p x i and e = U , with market shares
Since the MECs can be computed as:
we obtain the average MEC:
which allows us to determine the equilibrium conditions. 21 Here i is strictly positive for every good, implying positive markups, unless a ij = 0 for any i 6 = j (in which case commodities would be perfect substitutes).
A simple case emerges when a ii = 0 for any i, which implies i = 1= [2 (1 b i )]. This allows us to express Cournot prices as:
and monopolistic competition prices as:
With these preferences markups do not vanish when market shares are negligible, but rather approach to twice the marginal cost: indeed we get b p i 2c i when b i 0.
Entry
As discussed in Section 1.4, in general changes in market size, individual expenditure and productivity a¤ect the set of active …rms. However, under homotheticity the equilibrium variable pro…t (19) can be computed as:
, and, one can verify that is independent from the productivity component A, and linear with respect to EL for a given set b . Thus changes in aggregate productivity do not a¤ect b , while increases in market size and individual expenditures exert the same expansionary e¤ect on it.
Applying (24) to (20) the social planner problem reduces to
While there is no guarantee that an equilibrium set of goods b would be optimal, also an optimal set of goods would be neutral in common productivity shocks, and would increase in market size and individual expenditures through their product. We summarize these facts as follows (see the proof in Appendix A): Proposition 1. When preferences are homothetic, the identity of the goods provided in a free entry equilibrium or in a social optimum does not depend on aggregate productivity, and is symmetrically a¤ ected by expenditure and market size.
Of course these results hold for CES preferences (4), but both vanish for non-homothetic preferences, as we will discuss next.
GAS preferences
Although well-behaved demands can depend on prices in a general way, typical demand systems are simpler and depend on price aggregators or indices (as in the CES case), which allows us to study an alternative approach to monopolistic competition and to verify its consistency with our previous discussion. In this section we explore preferences that generate direct demand functions that depend on the own price and one common aggregator of all prices or, equivalently, inverse demand functions that depend on the own quantity and one common aggregator of all quantities. Pollak (1972) termed these as Generalized Additively Separable (GAS) preferences and showed that they encompass the following main classes: the directly additive (DA) and indirectly additive (IA) preferences (Houthakker, 1960) , their extension to an unexplored class of preferences analyzed by Gorman (1970a Gorman ( , 1987 ) that we will call "Gorman-Pollak preferences", and the class of implicit CES preferences whose discussion will be postponed to Section 4 as part of a wider type, the implicitly additive preferences (Hanoch, 1975) . We will show that under GAS preferences an equilibrium of monopolistic competition can be identically de…ned starting from either price or quantity competition and having …rms to perceive as given the value of the common aggregator of individual behaviors. This approach is entirely consistent with that adopted by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who suggested to neglect the impact of an individual …rm on marginal utility of income (the relevant aggregator in their setting), provided that this is su¢ ciently small to make this behaviour approximately "correct" (i.e., pro…t maximizing). Pollak (1972) de…ned GAS preferences as those exhibiting demand functions that can be written as:
where @s i =@x i , @x i =@p i < 0 and (x) and (s) are common functions ("aggregators") of respectively quantities and prices. Notice that we can write
i (x i ; (x)), so that s i ( ) is the partial inverse of x i ( ) with respect to its …rst argument, and (x) = (s (x)).
GAS preferences provide an ideal setting to study monopolistic competition, since we can naturally de…ne it as the environment in which each …rm correctly anticipates the value of the aggregators and , but takes ("perceives") them as given while choosing its strategy to maximize pro…ts:
It is important to stress that in this case the price and quantity equilibria of monopolistic competition do coincide. Since the "perceived" inverse demand of a commodity is just the inverse of the "perceived"direct demand, the corresponding elasticities i and " i are simply related by the condition " i = 1= i (as in a monopoly). Moreover, in Appendix B we prove that, provided that the market shares are negligible, to take the aggregator as given is approximately pro…t-maximizing for …rms, since the perceived demand elasticity is approximately equal to the average Morishima measure. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2. When preferences are of the GAS type and market shares become negligible, the perceived demand elasticity approximates the average Morishima elasticity.
Accordingly, a monopolistic competition equilibrium where …rms take aggregators as given approximates the imperfect competition equilibria of Section 1, which in this sense do "converge", when market shares become negligible.
The conditions for pro…t maximization of (34) taking as given either or de…ne a system of pricing or production rules as:
These rules, together with the budget constraint P j p j x j = E and the assumption that …rms correctly anticipate the actual demands, can be used to derive the equilibrium value of the aggregators as a function of the marginal cost vector c and of expenditure E, and therefore the equilibrium prices b p i (c; E) and quantities b x i (c; E). If we now assume that …rms decide on entry in the same spirit of their pricing/production decisions, namely by taking as given the relevant aggregator, we can make substantial progress in the analysis of monopolistic competiton. In particular, with additive preferences we can characterize which goods are going to be provided under free entry, and the selection e¤ects associated to changes in market size (i.e., opening up to free trade), expenditure (i.e., a demand shock) and aggregate productivity (i.e., technological growth).
Directly Additive preferences
DA preferences can be represented by a direct utility that is additive as in:
where the sub-utility functions u j are potentially all di¤erent but always increasing and concave. The inverse demand system is given by
;
. These preferences clearly belong to the GAS type, and were originally used by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in the symmetric version with u j (x) = u(x) for all j. 23 We can express the pro…ts of …rm i as:
The pro…t-maximizing condition with respect to x i , taking as given, can be rearranged in the pricing conditions:
; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
where p i (x i ) = u 0 i (x i )E= and we de…ne the elasticity of the marginal subutil-
, which corresponds to the elasticity of the inverse demand s i (x; ) for given . In this case i is also the MEC ij between good i and any other good j 6 = i, therefore it coincides also with the average MEC i discussed in Section 1. In general, the markups can either increase or decrease in the consumption, depending on whether i (x) is increasing or decreasing.
Given a set of active …rms, a monopolistic competition equilibrium is a vector (x; ) that satis…es the n + 1 equations u
] for each i = 1; ::; n and = P j x j u 0 j (x j ). Asymmetries of preferences and costs complicate its derivation because the quantity of each good depends on the quantities of all the other goods through the inverse demand system. However, under the assumptions that the pro…t-maximization problem is well de…ned for all …rms (essentially, that all marginal revenues are positive but decreasing), in Appendix C we show that it must be unique. Formally, we have:
, and that a solution to the pro…t maximization problem exists for a given set of active …rms i = 1; 2; :::; n. Then the equilibrium is unique.
We can easily study the comparative statics of this equilibrium. In particular, an increase in the expenditure level E increases all quantities, and raises the markup of …rm i if and only if 0 i (x) > 0: this allows one to obtain di¤erent forms of "pricing to market"for di¤erent goods depending on their MEC functions. A rise of the marginal cost c i decreases the quantity x i , inducing an "incomplete pass-through" on the price of …rm i if and only if its MEC is increasing. Also the indirect e¤ect on the markups of the other …rms (taking place through the change of the aggregator) depends on whether their MECs are increasing or decreasing. Finally, when a new good is introduced in the market through entry of an additional …rm, the production of all other commodities decreases and therefore the markup of a …rm decreases if and only if its MEC is increasing.
Let us now move to the question of which goods will be actually introduced: in Appendix C we show that both the free entry equilibrium and the optimal allocation of resources are unique, and we compare them. In particular, extending the approach of Spence (1976) we (inversely) rank the …rms both according to their survival coe¢ cient,
o , capturing their ability to survive in a free market, and according to their welfare coe¢ cient,
o , capturing their incremental contribution to welfare, and we identify the active …rms under equilibrium as well as under optimality. Notice that the survival coe¢ cient is proportional to the (minimum) of the ratio between average cost and average revenue, while the welfare coe¢ cient is proportional to the ratio of a commodity social cost and its incremental contribution to social welfare. We can think of these rankings as determining the actual sequences of introduction (respectively in a market equilibrium and in a social optimum), and they allow us to study how entry is a¤ected by a change of market size, expenditure or aggregate productivity. The main result concerning the equilibrium of monopolistic competition with free entry is the following:
Proposition 3. When preferences are DA, the identity of the goods provided in the free entry equilibrium is uniquely determined, and an increase of the market size or a fall of productivity favor …rms with the largest MECs, while a change of expenditure is neutral on the survival ranking.
With the expression "to favor" we refer to improvements of the survival ranking (which apply to the marginal …rm selected by the market to be active at the equilibrium). The intuition for the e¤ects of market size and aggregate productivity is that …rms with the largest unit pro…tability (determined by the value of their MEC), i.e., facing more rigid perceived demands, can make the best of an increase of market size and are less harmed by a common marginal cost increase. Instead, the neutrality of expenditure relies on the fact that its has a proportional impact on the pro…tability of all …rms: therefore an expansion of demand attracts new …rms in the market, but without altering their relative pro…tability.
24 . The welfare ranking di¤ers in general from the equilibrium one, and depends crucially on the elasticity of the subutility i (x) = u 0 i (x)x=u i (x), which measures how much of the utility provided by commodity i is captured by the revenue it generates (in utility terms). In Appendix C we prove the following:
Proposition 4. When preferences are DA, in the social optimum an increase of the market size or a productivity fall favor goods with the smallest elasticities of the subutility, while a change of expenditure is neutral on the welfare ranking.
An increase of expenditure and/or market size and a rise of productivity relaxe the resource constraint of the social planner, allowing for the introduction of more goods and in larger quantities. But while a change of expenditure does not alter the welfare ranking of commodities (as in equilibrium), an increase of the market size or a fall of productivity change the relative incremental bene…t of producing more of each of them, favoring those with the smallest elasticities i , where these are evaluated at the quantity which de…nes the welfare coe¢ cient. The intuition is the following. When a new commodity is optimally introduced, 2 4 This provides a rationale for the results on the selection e¤ects of globalization derived by Zhelobodko et al. (2012) and Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) in a setting with symmetric goods and …rms with heterogeneous marginal costs. They show that a market size increase has an impact on e¢ ciency which depends on whether the MEC is increasing or decreasing. In fact, in that setting the …rms facing the largest MECs are either the most or the least e¢ cient …rms according to the MEC being either decreasing or increasing in consumption.
it is priced proportionally to its marginal cost (see Section 1.4). Thus i is proportional to c i x i =u i , implying that when market size increases or productivity falls the welfare ranking is rebalanced favoring those commodities with the smallest ratio between their variable cost and their incremental contribution to utility.
What can be said in general about the comparison of the free entry equilibrium to the social optimum? Under DA preferences, a possible approach is to compare the commodity rankings discussed above. Comparing W i to S i one can notice immediately that their ratio will tend to be small when i is small, making relatively more di¢ cult the introduction of such a commodity in a market equilibrium. The reason is that i is proportional to the ratio between the revenue generated by commodity i and its contribution to the welfare, p i x i =u i . In practice, a social planner may want to o¤er goods that are not pro…table enough to be provided by the market, and the process of increase of the market size associated with globalization may also lead the market to introduce new goods whose demand is relatively rigid, while it would be optimal to introduce other goods whose incremental surplus is relatively larger. The equilibrium and optimal paths of product creation may go hand in hand, as in our CES example, but they may also diverge. We will now illustrate this with other examples.
Power sub-utility A simple case of DA preferences is based on the sub-utility power function:
where both the MEC i 2 [0; 1) and the shift parametersq i > 0 can di¤er among goods. These preferences are a special instance of the "direct addilog" preferences discussed by Houthakker (1960) . Of course, they are CES as in (4) only when the exponents are identical, otherwise they are not even homothetic. As a natural generalization of the CES case they have been used in applications with perfect competition. 25 Under monopolistic competition, since the MECs are constant, markups are also constant and di¤erent across …rms, and the equilibrium prices are:
which show a full pass-through of changes in the marginal cost and independence from the pricing behavior of competitors and the expenditure level. Instead the equilibrium quantities b x i depend on the equilibrium value b , but explicit solutions are not generally available. Finally, i = 1 i is a constant in this case, and we can compute the survival and welfare coe¢ cients as:
suggesting that the commodities that fare poorly in the market equilibrium compared to the optimum tend to be those with the largest MEC (which tend to be associated with a larger pro…t, but also with a larger welfare contribution). Interestingly, in this case the equilibrium selection e¤ects provided by changes in market size or aggregate productivity point to the same direction suggested by the alledged change in the welfare ranking (of course the survival ranking coincides with the welfare ranking in the special CES case, as already noticed in Section 1.4).
Stone-Geary sub-utility Consider a simple version of the well-known StoneGeary preferences (see Geary, 1950-51 and Stone, 1954) where:
with every x i positive but small enough to insure a positive demand. 26 Solving for the elasticity of the perceived inverse demand we get i (x) = x=(x + x i ) and then the pricing condition:
The right-hand side is decreasing in x i because a higher value of it increases demand elasticity. However, the equilibrium price of each …rm cannot be derived independently from the behavior of competitors: the interdependence between …rms created by demand conditions requires a fully- ‡edged equilibrium analysis. By the Hotelling-Wold identity we have:
where = P j x j = (x j + x j ). Combining this with the pricing condition we can compute the quantity x i = p x i E=(c i ) x i and the (normalized) price rules
p x j c j and using the adding up constraint we obtain the condition n = p E = 1, which can be solved for the equilibrium value:
Replacing b in the price rule we get the …nal closed-form solution for the monopolistic competition price of …rm i:
In this example the price of each …rm i increases less than proportionally in its marginal cost c i and decreases in the preference parameter x i (which reduces i ).
Moreover, an increase in expenditure raises the markup of each good less than proportionally. Note that each price is increasing in , therefore an increase in the marginal cost c j of a competitor or in the preference parameter x j (which reduces the associated marginal utility) induce, albeit indirectly, a small increase in the markup of …rm i. Finally, entry of new …rms reduces all prices, and when it is due to an increase in the market size tends to favor the introduction of goods with a low x j , i.e., a more rigid demand.
Quadratic sub-utility Consider quadratic sub-utilities as in:
with i ; i > 0. The associated preferences are a special instance of the quasihomothetic preferences analyzed in Pollak (1971) . Assuming that s i > 0 for all i, 27 the perceived inverse demand elasticity is given by i (x) = i x=( i i x), so that monopolistic competition pricing can be computed as follows:
Since s i (x i ; ) = ( i i x i ) = we obtain the production and pricing rules x i = ( i c i =E) =2 i and s i = ( i + c i =E) =2 . Using the adding up constraint allows us to solve for the equilibrium value of the quantity aggregator as: , and eventually to obtain the equilibrium price:
The price of each …rm i increases less than proportionally in its marginal cost c i as well as in the intensity of preferences for the good i and in the expenditure level E. An increase in market size tend to favor the introduction of goods with small i and high i , since their demands are more rigid.
Indirectly Additive preferences
IA preferences can be represented by an additive indirect utility as:
2 7 This requires i > 2 i x i .
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with sub-utilities v j decreasing and convex (Houthakker, 1960 ). Elsewhere we have used the symmetric version of these preferences for the analysis of monopolistic competition. 28 The direct demand function is given by:
, which con…rms that these preferences belong to the GAS type. Here we can express the pro…ts of …rm i as:
For a given value of the price aggregator the elasticity of perceived demand
, which is also the MES " ij between goods i and j (i 6 = j) and thus coincides with the average MES " i of Section 1. The pro…t-maximizing price for each …rm is then given by the solution to the price condition:
; i = 1; 2; :::; n (47) (which requires " i > 1). Under weak conditions a solution to (47) exists, and it is unique under the assumption that 2" i > sv 000 i =v 00 i for any i, which ensures that the second-order condition for pro…t maximization is satis…ed.
Remarkably, each condition (47) is now su¢ cient to determine the monopolistic competition price of each …rm in function of its own marginal cost and consumers'expenditure. This means that for the entire class of IA preferences each …rm i can choose its price b p i (c i ; E) independently from the behavior of competitors, as well as from their cost conditions or from parameters concerning their goods (e.g., from their "qualities"). An increase of expenditure increases the price of a good, and changes in its marginal cost are undershifted on the price if and only if the MES is increasing, which means that the demand is perceived as less elastic when expenditure is higher. Contrary to the DA case, the entry of a new …rm does not change the prices of the pre-existing goods, but just reduces their production (through the increase of ).
All the equilibrium quantities (and the other …rm-level variables, such as sales and pro…ts) as well as welfare measures can then be recovered from the direct demand functions. For this reason, this class of preferences can be naturally employed in multicountry trade models, whereas the e¤ects of di¤erential trade costs, qualities and demand elasticities can be empirically assessed. A natural outcome of this model is that goods of higher quality or lower substitutability generate higher revenues in a given market and therefore are more likely to be exported to more distant countries. Similar Alchian-Allen e¤ ects ("shipping the good apples out") have been explored in recent works by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Crozet et al. (2012) , Feenstra and Romalis (2014) and others, but always retaining a CES structure (4) that generates identical markups across goods. The IA speci…cation allows us to move easily beyond the case of common markups, and to endogenize quality di¤erentiation across …rms and across destination within …rms, whose empirical relevance has been pointed out in Manova and Zhang (2012) .
In addition, under IA we can characterize the unique free entry equilibrium in terms of a survival ranking, which is simply given by the relative pro…tability, i.e., e
o . In Appendix D we prove:
Proposition 5. When preferences are IA, the identity of the goods provided in the free entry equilibrium is uniquely determined, and an increase of the expenditure level or a rise of productivity favors …rms with the largest MESs, while an increase of market size is neutral on the survival ranking.
The intuition is that an increase of expenditure (which exerts its impact through the demand size) or of aggregate productivity (which has a direct impact on unit pro…tability) a¤ects proportionally more …rms facing the most elastic demands, which make the best of them in terms of their survival ability, while an increase of market size has a proportional impact on all …rms.
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The social planner problem (20) simpli…es to max
Fi=L , but in this case it is not possible to establish a welfare ranking among commodities (essentially because the incremental welfare depends on the optimal value of the aggregator). Once again, there is no presumption that the market should provide the same goods provided by a social planner (except for the particular case of CES preferences).
Power sub-utility Consider a power sub-utility as:
where heterogeneity derives from the shift parameter q i > 0 and the constant MES parameter " i > 1, implying that preferences are neither CES nor homothetic (unless " j = " for any j). 30 The pricing of …rm i under monopolistic competition is immediately derived as:
which implies again full pass-through of changes of the marginal cost. It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium quantity (for a given set of active …rms):
and consequently sales and pro…ts. Clearly, q i is a shift parameter capturing the quality of good i, that leaves unchanged the price but increases pro…t by increasing sales. The relative productions, sales and pro…ts of …rms depend on the relative quality of their goods, on their cost e¢ ciency and demand elasticity, and on the level of expenditure in simple ways that can be exploited in empirical work.
Translated power sub-utility Consider the following sub-utility:
with quality parameter a i > 0 (such that v i (s) = 0 if s > a i ) and i > 0. It delivers simple perceived demand functions, including the case of a linear demand (for i = 1) and the limit cases of a perfectly rigid demand ( i ! 0) and a perfectly elastic demand ( i ! 1). These preferences have been recently applied by Bertoletti et al. (2018) and Macedoni and Weinberger (2018) to study the welfare impact of trade liberalization and quality regulation in multicountry models with heterogeneous …rms. Since the MES for good i is " i (s) = i s=(a i s), the price of …rm i can be computed as:
which shows incomplete pass-through of marginal cost changes (parametrized by the …rm-speci…c parameter i ) and markups increasing in the intensity of preference for each good (as captured by willingness-to pay parameter a i ) and in the expenditure level. A positive shock to the expenditure level tends to favor …rms producing commodities whose a i parameters are relatively small while the i parameters are relative large (thus facing relatively more elastic demands).
Gorman-Pollak preferences
Building on Gorman (1970a) and Pollak (1972) , 31 Gorman (1987) has characterized the main class of GAS preferences through the following extension of additivity. Suppose that preferences can be represented by the utility functions:
3 1 See Terence Gorman's collected works published in Blackorby and Shorrocks (1995) .
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where can be seen as generating the bene…t of increasing the e¤ ective quantity of good i to x i at the utility cost ( ), which is equivalent (in the dual representation of preferences) to the possibility of reducing the inconvenience of consumption ( ) at the cost of increasing the e¤ ective price of good i to s i . We assume that and satisfy the conditions:
Their role is to cancel out any cross e¤ect on utility, as in the case of additive preferences. The demand system can then be easily computed as:
It can be shown that = 0 ( ) and = 0 ( ), so that the utility-maximizing choices satisfy
, and that e = . We label these as "Gorman-Pollak" preferences and propose them for an application to monopolistic competition with asymmetric goods.
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It follows from (54) that, for given value of the aggregators, the properties of the perceived demand functions depend on the functional forms of u i and v i . Preferences are indeed CES when the subutilities u i and v i have a common power expression. They are homothetic when ( ) = ln and ( ) = ln , 33 a case which covers the GAS demand systems investigated in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017) . They are directly additive when ( ) = (so that = 1). Finally, they are indirectly additive when ( ) = (so that = 1). Obviously, the functional forms in (52) have to satisfy the usual regularity conditions (explored in Fally, 2018) .
To study monopolistic competition, let us de…ne the elasticities i (z)
. When …rms maximize their pro…ts:
taking as given the aggregators, it is immediate to verify that the perceived demand elasticities of monopolistic competition are given by i ( x i ) and " i ( s i ), which imply the equilibrium pricing conditions:
In contrast to the case of additive preferences, within the Gorman-Pollak class the relevant demand elasticities do depend in general on the values of the aggregators, and do not directly correspond to the Morishima measures. Nevertheless Proposition 2 applies and the equilibrium (55) approximates the imperfect competition equilibria of Section 1 when market shares are negligible. We have employed symmetric Gorman-Pollak preferences to study monopolistic competition with free entry of heterogeneous …rms in Bertoletti and Etro (2018) : beside the particular cases where they are homothetic and/or additive, the GormanPollak preferences do not exhibit neutralities of productivity, expenditure or market size on pricing and product selection and deliver ine¢ cient entry. Moreover, even asymmetric Gorman-Pollak preferences retain a tractability that is well illustrated by next example.
Self-dual addilog preferences The family of "self-dual addilog"preferences introduced by Houthakker (1965) and investigated by Pollak (1972) belongs to the Gorman-Pollak class. For this family of preferences the direct demand system is given by:
where q i > 0 is a shift parameter re ‡ecting the quality of good i, " i > 1 governs the perceived elasticity of demand and (s) is implicitly de…ned by the condition
We assume 2 (0; 1), and " i 6 = " j for some i and j (otherwise preferences are CES). Moreover, the inverse demand system is given by:
where (x) is implicitly de…ned by the condition
1 e e i = 1, with Pollak (1972) showed that the underlying preferences can be represented for 6 = 1=2 by:
with the aggregators de…ned above. In the special case with = 1=2 preferences are homothetic and and take a logarithmic form with respect to the corresponding aggregators. Given the inverse and direct demand systems, when …rms maximize pro…ts taking as given the aggregators, we immediately obtain the following prices under monopolistic competition:
where the idiosyncratic markups are constant as in our additive, power subutility examples. In fact, we can also derive the equilibrium quantities as:
These results make this family the natural extension of the power additive preferences. The availability of a homothetic version, with the associated well-de…ned price and consumption indexes, and the ‡exibility of the general speci…cation provide interesting advantages for applications that depart from the CES paradigm.
Separable preferences and many aggregators
In this section we …nally deal with the extension of the approach of Section 3 to preferences generating demand systems that depend on multiple common aggregators. We begin with the case where each demand depends on two common aggregators, and can be written as:
Assuming @s i =@x i and @x i =@p i < 0, again we obtain
where (x) = (s (x)) and (x) = ! (s (x)). We can then keep de…ning unambiguously monopolistic competition as the environment in which …rms adopt their strategies anticipating the correct value of the aggregators but taking them as given. We consider two types of preferences which satisfy property (59), and we conclude by discussing the case of more than two aggregators.
Separable marginal utility preferences
Property (59) holds for any preferences for which the marginal utility of each good can be written in a separable fashion as:
with @f i =@x i < 0. Preferences with such a separable marginal utility include the three classes of GAS preferences studied in Section 3 and others. The inverse demand is
, where = e = P j x j f j is the second aggregator. The perceived inverse demand elasticity when both aggregators are taken as given is provided by the function:
which depends crucially on the value of the aggregator that a¤ects marginal utility.
To show how one can adapt our approach in this environment, let us consider the direct utility:
where > 0 and = P n j=1 x j . One can recognize here the non-linear component of the utility speci…cation used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) under a common and quadratic subutility for any good. This class of preferences satis…es the separability (60) with
. Within this class we have market shares b i = (u 0 i ) x i = , and the corresponding perceived, inverse demand elasticity is given by:
which allows one to compute the pricing conditions. It is useful to sketch how in principle one can apply the solution procedure of Section 3 in the presence of two aggregators. Consider the quadratic subutility u i (x) = i x i 2 x 2 where the parameters i and i change across goods. The pricing condition becomes:
and by the Hotelling-Wold identity we have:
where = P j x j j j x j . Thus we can compute the quantity rules x i = ( i c i =E)=2 i and the pricing rules s i = ( i + c i =E) =2 . Using the budget constraint one can solve for the marginal utility of income ( ) in function of the other aggregator and for the quantity x i ( ; ( )). Using the de…nition = P n j=1 x j ( ; ( )) we can solve for b (c; E) and then ( b (c; E)), and derive the prices:p
which generalize those in (44). In a similar way one can analyze preferences whose indirect utility function features a marginal disutility that can be written in the separable fashion V i (s) = g i (s i ; (s)), with @g i =@s i > 0. The corresponding demand satis…es (59) with ! = j j = P i g i s i . Again, preferences of this kind do nest the three classes of GAS preferences of Section 3, but they also include others. Examples have been occasionally explored in the literature, though under symmetric conditions -as for the homothetic preferences proposed by Datta and Dixon (2001) and the generalized quadratic indirect utility we studied elsewhere.
Implicitly additive preferences
The other demand system satisfying (59) is delivered by the implicitly additive preferences of Hanoch (1975) . Particular cases have been used by Kimball (1995) under homotheticity to study nominal price rigidities in macroeconomics, and by Feenstra and Romalis (2014) to study endogenous qualities in trade. 35 Let us assume that preferences can be represented by a direct utility U (x) which is implicitly de…ned by:
where the "transformation function" F satis…es the relevant regularity conditions (F must be monotonic). Then preferences are directly implicitly additive, and of course direct additivity is just a special case of it. They are also homothetic if F i (x i ; U ) = F i (x i =U ) for any i. The marginal utility of commodity i is given by:
where ' = P n j=1 F j U , so that the marginal utility depends now on two aggregators, namely ' and the same utility function U .
The Hotelling-Wold identity for utility maximization allows us to solve for
, i = 1; ::; n, where = U and = P j F j j x j (notice that no aggregator corresponds to the marginal utility of income, and that ' does not appear in the expression of demand). The perceived inverse demand elasticity when both aggregators are taken as given is provided by the function:
which depends on the consumption of the speci…c good and on the utility level. As Hanoch (1975) noted, the properties of the "substitution function"
completely determine the substitutability of good i along an indi¤erence curve, and in our monopolistic competition setting this function determines markups.
In Appendix E we show that the result obtained for GAS preferences in Proposition 2 extends to preferences satisfying implicit additivity: Proposition 6. When preferences are implicitly additive and the market shares become negligible, the perceived demand elasticity approximates the average Morishima elasticity.
Accordingly, also in this case the monopolistic competition equilibrium where …rms take aggregators as given approximates the imperfect competition equilibria of Section 1, which thus do converge.
A similar analysis can be employed to study indirectly implicitly additive preferences. These can be represented by an indirect utility V (s) that is implicitly de…ned by G = P n j=1 G j (s j ; V ) 1, where the function G has to satisfy some regularity conditions. In this environment the marginal disutilities depend on two aggregators, one of which is the utility again, which a¤ects the perceived direct demand elasticity. In general, preferences whose indirect utility is implicitly additive di¤er from those with a direct utility that is implicitly additive, but both properties are satis…ed by the class of "implicit CES"preferences that we discuss below.
Implicit CES preferences
Consider the class of implicitly additive preferences with direct utility de…ned by (65) with:
where (U ) andq j (U ) are constant for a given utility level but can change across indi¤erence curves. Note that all F i are homogeneous of the same degree 1 with respect to x j : then x i F i i = (1 ) F i and = 1 . Thus, by the Hotelling-Wald identity, the inverse demand of commodity i is given by:
which depends on one aggregator only. This is also the last class of preferences that belongs to the GAS type (Gorman, 1970a,b) . Equivalently one can represent the same preference class by an indirect implicitly additive utility function with
. It is easy to verify that monopolistic competition prices satisfy:
which shows that markups are identical across …rms in spite of the di¤erences among goods. Nevertheless, markups can vary with changes in expenditure or costs through their impact on the equilibrium utility.
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We have employed a symmetric version of these preferences to study monopolistic competition with free entry of heterogeneous …rms in Bertoletti and Etro (2018) , showing that they generate an optimal equilibrium. Intuitively, 3 6 By using (67) the equilibrium utility must satisfy:
the property that markups are common across goods implies that monopolistic competition does not bias the equilibrium consumption distribution with respect to the optimal one. In fact, also with asymmetric implicit CES preferences the social planner allocation turns out to be an equilibrium allocation when the industry pro…ts are redistributed to the consumers, which extends one of the properties of the explicit CES preferences. All these peculiarities make this class of preferences particularly attractive for applications.
Other separable preferences
There are other preferences generating demand systems that satisfy (59) without …tting in the earlier types. To exemplify this possibility, in Appendix D we build an example, based on the so-called Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , which nests a translog speci…ca-tion of Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017) . Monopolistic competition under the restricted AIDS preferences delivers demand elasticities which grow unboundedly when market share becomes negligible, providing marginal cost pricing in the limit. We conclude by noting that in principle the approach to monopolistic competition that we have explored when preferences are separable can be extended to other cases in which each demand function depends on more than two aggregators. In fact, the associated procedure to determine the equilibrium can be applied to any system of well de…ned "perceived" demands as soon as the alledged behavioral rules (based on the perceived demand elasticities) are consistent with the demand system, so that …rms can be seen as correctly anticipating the actual demands. However, to argue that taking all aggregators as given is approximately pro…t-maximizing for …rms, one has to verify that when the market shares become negligible the perceived demand elasticity does converge to the relevant Morishima measure (this basically requires that the impact of each …rm on the aggregators vanishes).
General equilibrium applications
Our analysis of monopolistic competition can shed some light on issues that cannot be approached on the basis of the classic Dixit-Stiglitz model with CES preferences, as endogenous quality di¤erentiation in trade and the impact of markup variability on the business cycle. To exemplify, in this section we move to a continuum of goods in line with the applied literature and focus on the case of implicit CES preferences, which provide a new and rich generalization of the explicit CES preferences preserving their simplicity. We sketch two applications focused respectively on price di¤erentiation across …rms and over time, and we then discuss how our preliminary results should extend qualitatively to more general preferences.
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Endogenous quality di¤erentiation and trade
As a …rst application, we investigate the impact of globalization when goods have di¤erent and endogenous qualities. In the basic Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous …rms, opening up to costless trade generates gains from variety without any selection e¤ects (which, as well known, would emerge if there was a change of trade costs). We show below that when active …rms invest in quality di¤erentiation a welfare-increasing globalization can directly reduce markups, a¤ect the distribution of qualities across …rms and generate selection e¤ects.
Suppose that preferences are implicitly de…ned by:
where is the set of consumed goods, q(!) can be interpreted as the quality of commodity ! and "(V ) > 1 can vary with utility (unless preferences are explicit CES). To …x ideas we will endorse the assumption " 0 (V ) 0, so that goods can become more substitutable when utility increases. By Roy'identity, individual demand for commodity ! is given by
where utility V is the relevant aggregator. As usual, labor is the only input and the wage is normalized at unity. Assume that, after paying an entry cost F e , …rms draw a cost parameter z from a distribution G(z) on [0; 1) and pay a common …xed cost F to produce at a marginal cost c(q; z), which is increasing and convex in quality q and increasing in z. A z-…rm supplying quality q at price p faces variable pro…ts:
where L is the population of identical consumers with expenditure/labour endowment E. Its optimal price p(z) and quality q(z) can be shown to satisfy:
which implies a common markup but possibly heterogeneous qualities across …rms. The model is consistent with either a positive or negative correlation between quality and cost e¢ ciency, as well as with a common quality in the special case of a marginal cost "multiplicative" with respect to z. Moreover, " 0 (V ) > 0 implies that the markups decrease with the utility level, and that product quality increases (decreases) with the utility level if the elasticity of marginal cost to quality is decreasing (increasing) with respect to z. The monotonicity of pro…ts in z allows us to determine the cut-o¤ẑ such that (ẑ) = F and the measure n = N G (ẑ) of active …rms out of the mass N of …rms created. Free entry ex ante requires Rẑ 0 [ (z) F ]dG(z) = F e , and by using the budget constraint and the pricing rule we can compute that:
The model is closed replacing price and quality rules in (69) to obtain an implicit value for the equilibrium utility V . We can now investigate the e¤ects of opening up to costless trade (namely an increase in L). It is standard to verify that with explicit CES preferences (" 0 (V ) = 0) the measure n of consumed varieties increases, but there are no selection e¤ects: the associated increase in utility does not a¤ectẑ and the quality distribution of goods. Consider now the case where " 0 (V ) > 0 and the marginal cost is multiplicative in z: then an increase in utility is associated with a markup reduction and a selection of the more e¢ cient …rms (ẑ decreases), but all …rms produce the same quality. Finally, with a more general cost function, opening up to trade can generate selection e¤ects that change also the distribution of qualities across active …rms. Similar qualitative results can be obtained with other classes of the separable preferences analyzed in this paper (but, interestingly, the selection e¤ects of market size would vanish under indirect additivity, as shown in Bertoletti and Etro, 2017) . Multicountry applications could reproduce the quality di¤erentiation among …rms and across destinations that seems to emerge empirically (Manova and Zhang, 2012) and could be used to investigate the alledged gains from trade.
Markup variability and business cycles propagation
As a second application, we introduce monopolistic competition with implicit CES preferences in a standard ‡exible price dynamic model (see for instance Woodford, 2003, or Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) . In line with the macroeconomic literature we assume an exogenous measure of goods normalized to unity and a single representative agent living forever with utility:
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, x t (!) is the consumption of good ! at time t and C t is aggregate consumption (intratemporal utility) at t. A perfectly competitive sector employs capital K t and exogenous labor L to produce intermediate goods according to a neoclassical production function Y t = F (K t ; L) subject to productivity shocks. The intermediate good is used to produce …nal goods with a one-to-one technology by monopolistically competitive …rms and is the numeraire. In each period, the expenditure on each variety x t (!) and on the future stock of capital K t+1 have to maximize utility under a standard resource constraint:
where 2 [0; 1] is the depreciation rate, and total pro…ts t =
and the Euler condition t = E[R t+1 t+1 ], where the Lagrange multiplier t corresponds to the marginal utility of income at time t and the gross return to capital is as usual given by
. Under monopolistic competition, all …rms set the same price so that C t = x t (!) and:
The markup is common but counter-or pro-cyclical according to the sign of 0 (C). The Euler condition can be rewritten as:
which implies a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution but corresponds to the canonical version only under explicit CES preferences. Otherwise markup variability a¤ects consumption choices and the consequent propagation of the business cycle. In particular, under the assumption 0 (C) < 0, a temporary increase of productivity generates a temporary reduction in markups which promotes current consumption and magni…es the shock propagation. Accordingly, through the impact on relative prices over time, the demand side plays a new role in the business cycle generated by ‡exible price models under monopolistic competition. 37 The same qualitative results emerge with other non-homothetic preferences as long as the relevant elasticity, namely the (average) MEC, is decreasing in consumption. A quantitative analysis of similar mechanisms in a fully- ‡edged Real Business Cycle model with endogenous labor supply (which would be directly related to the real wage and therefore inversely to the markup) can be found in Cavallari and Etro (2017) : their estimate of preference parameters delivers countercyclical markups under monopolistic competition, and allows the model to outperform the standard version with perfect competition in matching moments of the aggregate variables. Further applications with nominal frictions would be natural.
Conclusion
We have analyzed imperfect and monopolistic competition when consumers have asymmetric preferences over many di¤erentiated commodities and …rms are heterogeneous in costs. De…ning monopolistic competition as the market structure which arises when market shares are negligible, we have been able to obtain a well-de…ned and workable characterization of monopolistic competition pricing.
Moreover, we have presented a simple and consistent approach to the functioning of a market with monopolistic competition when demand functions depend on common aggregators.
While asymmetric CES aggregators preserve the optimality of the entry process and the neutrality of productivity, expenditure and market size on it, under more general preferences the goods introduced in an equilibrium can differ from those provided in the social optimum, and productivity growth and changes in expenditure and market size a¤ect the identity of goods selected by the market. As we have argued, our approach can be usefully employed in trade and macroeconomic applications. Most of the recent research on heterogeneous …rms is actually based on symmetric preferences (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Dhingra and Morrow, 2019; Arkolakis et al., 2019) , which is hardly realistic, especially to analyze welfare. Also the macroeconomic applications of monopolistic competition have usually focused on symmetric homothetic aggregators (Kimball, 1995; Woodford, 2003; Bilbiie et al., 2012) . Departing from symmetry and homotheticity allows to examine markup variability among goods and over time and its in ‡uence on welfare along the business cycle and across countries in more realistic ways.
Appendix
A: Monopolistic competition with Homothetic preferences. Proof of Proposition 1. Changes in aggregate productivity A cannot a¤ect the pro…t of active …rms due to the homogenenity of degree zero of both the average MES " (p) and the market share p i P i (p) EL=P (p): thus they do not a¤ect the set b of …rms that are active in a free entry equilibrium. Expression (31) and (32) immediately show that the same happens to , and that only the product EL matters for both variable pro…ts and social welfare.
B: Monopolistic competition with GAS preferences. Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that preferences belong to the GAS type. Taking as given the relevant aggregator, in a monopolistic competition equilibrium …rms compute the perceived (inverse) demand elasticity according to:
We now show that, when market shares are negligible, to take the aggregator as given approximately coincides with using the average Morishima measures as the relevant demand elasticities, and is thus approximately pro…t maximizing. Let us start by computing the MEC between commodities i and j (i 6 = j):
This implies that the average MEC is:
By di¤erentiating the identity P j s i (x j ; ) x j = 1 we can also compute:
Accordingly we have i i ij when b i 0. 38 Notice that i = i = ij even when shares are not negligible if both preferences and the consumption bundle (and then the price vector) are symmetric (as in Bertoletti and Etro, 2016) . 39 Analogously, one can derive the MES and show that with GAS preferences small market shares imply " i " i " ij and thus " i 1 i . Thus to take the aggregator as given while choosing the own price is approximately correct when market shares are indeed negligible.
C: Monopolistic competition with DA preferences. Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that preferences are DA, that solutions to the maximization of pro…ts (37) 
that the monopolistically competitive quantity of any …rm is increasing with respect to E= . Moreover, it follows from (38) that:
Thus, the pro…t-maximizing revenue of a monopolistically competitive …rm is increasing with respect to its equilibrium quantity. Since total revenue must be equal to the expenditure level E, it follows that there is a single value of which characterizes an equilibrium for a given set of …rms (and a vector of marginal cost c).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider free entry under DA of preferences. By using (37) we can write the condition of a non-negative pro…t as:
Following Spence (1976) , let us rank …rms increasingly according to their survival coe¢ cient (S N S N 1 ::: S 1 ):
The equilibrium can be described as follows: for a given E= , any active …rm i maximizes pro…t by setting its Lerner index equal to the MEC i , independently from F i =L. This determines the whole set of quantities for the active …rms, and 3 9 Since (h 6 = i 6 = j) then the aggregator . After any entry, the value of aggregator must increase to reduce the expenditure in the incumbent commodities, making room for the entrant and survival more di¢ cult for all …rms. In an equilibrium, all active …rms get non-negative pro…ts, and their quantities are consistent with the value of the aggregator . All the other …rms would expect a negative pro…t if entering the market (taking as given). It is then natural to characterize the unique free entry equilibrium by S n E= , where only …rms i = 1; ::; n are active.
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Di¤erentiating S i and using the envelope theorem, we have:
where i is evaluated at the quantity x i = Fi ciL
which de…nes S i . Accordingly, an increase of market size (which has a positive impact on all …rms) or in a common component of the marginal cost (a reduction of productivity) alters the survival ranking favoring …rms producing varieties with the largest MECs (thus facing steeper perceived demand functions), while expenditure is neutral.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the optimal allocation. It is easy to verify that only goods with the smallest welfare coe¢ cient:
will be introduced. Suppose not: then, the same sub-utility level could be realized and some resources saved by introducing another commodity with a smaller coe¢ cient. We can thus rank commodities according to their welfare coe¢ cients. By direct computation we have the following derivatives in elasticity terms:
where i = d ln u i =d ln x i is evaluated at the quantity x i = Fi ciL i (xi) 1 i (xi) which de…nes W i . Accordingly, an increase of market size or a reduction of productivity requires to increase proportionally more the welfare coe¢ cient of commodities with the largest i , while expenditure is neutral.
D: Monopolistic competition with IA preferences. Proof of Proposition 5. The free entry equilibrium under indirectly additive preferences can be characterized starting from the non-negative pro…t condition:
; 4 1 Notice that the ranking is independent from the values of expenditure and . Basically, it simply says that a …rm ranked m cannot be active if a …rm ranked l m is not. The identity of the marginal active …rm depends on the contrary also on the expenditure level.
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Let us de…ne the survival coe¢ cient:
which is proportional to the ratio of …xed cost and variable pro…t, and it has to be evaluated at the pro…t-maximizing value of p. Firms can then be ranked in terms of their survival coe¢ cient: after any entry, the value of aggregator must increase, to reduce demand and expenditure on the incumbent …rms, making survival more di¢ cult for all …rms. A free entry equilibrium is determined by the unique value of that makes all active …rms to get non negative pro…ts (and an aggregate revenue equal to EL), while all other …rms expect a negative pro…t if entering the market (taking as given). The market equilibrium then satis…es e S n L for the set of active …rms, i = 1; ::; n. Since @ ln e S i @ ln L = 0, @ ln e S i @ ln E = " i and @ ln e S i @ ln A = 1 " i an increase of expenditure or aggregate productivity unambigously favours …rms with larger MESs, while an increase in market population is neutral on the ranking.
E: Monopolistic competition with Implicitly Additive preferences. Proof of Proposition 6. Let us consider the directly implicitly additive preferences de…ned by (65). Since ln(s i =s j ) = ln F 
where we used the fact that b i = F i i (x i ; )x i = . This allows us to compute the average MEC as:
Therefore, b i 0 implies i i ij , and taking the aggregates as given is approximately correct when the market shares are negligible. Notice that i = i = ij even when this is not the case if both preferences and the consumption bundle (and then the price vector) are symmetric.
42 Similar results can be shown when preferences are indirectly implicitly additive. 4 2 Since (h 6 = i 6 = j):
ih (x) ij (x) = " F h hU (x h; (x)) F i h (x h ; (x)) We present here an example of preferences that do not belong to the types analyzed in Section 4, but do satisfy the property (59) for which the demand system depends on two aggregators. The speci…cation is based on the so-called Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . Consider preferences represented by the following indirect utility: and assume P j ij = P j j = 0 and P n j=1 j = 1 to satisfy the regularity conditions, and ij = ji without loss of generality. For any commodity i the marginal disutility is:
and the direct demand functions can be derived by Roy's identity as:
This demand system does not depend in general just on one or two common aggregators, thus we cannot use it to study monopolistic competition as an environment where …rms set prices taking aggregators as given as in Section 4. However, consider the following additional restrictions that introduce some symmetry between goods:
with > 0. In this case, the marginal disutility becomes:
which is separable in three aggregators, namely , and:
The direct demand functions read as:
where only two aggregators remain. Accordingly, this restricted AIDS speci…ca-tion satis…es (59). Notice that the aggregator also disappears when i = 0 for any i, delivering the homothetic translog demand considered in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017) , which has the GAS property. Otherwise, perceived demands and demand elasticities depend on two aggregators. Taking both of them as given, this elasticity can be computed as:
and it grows unboundedly when the market share becomes negligible, implying b p i c i when b i 0. Of course, this outcome is consistent with what one could obtain using the average Morishima elasticities to study strategic interactions as in Section 1.
